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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant / Petitioner,

:
:

v.

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

:

Case No. 20081054-SC

Plaintiff/ Respondent.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF / RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals issued its decision in this action on November 28, 2008.
Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.. 2008 UT App 426, 198 P.3d 1003
(Addendum A). A timely petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by the defendant. This
Court granted that petition, limited to two questions stated by the Court. This Court has
jurisdiction to hear this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (West
Supp. 2008).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and application of
relevant precedent to Petitioner's claim for severance damages for loss of view.
2. Whether damages for loss of view may be segregated from overall severance
damages.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the
court of appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the court of appeals. State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, |11, 103 P.3d 699.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
Constitution of Utah, Art. 1, § 22 [Private property for public use]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 (West Supp. 2008). Compensation and damages —
How assessed.
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by any of the parties to
the proceedings, and determine and assess:
(1) (a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements
pertaining to the realty;
(b) the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property; and
(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or
interest in each shall be separately assessed;
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel,
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff;
(3) if the property, though no part of it is taken, will be damaged by the construction of
the proposed improvement, and the amount of the damages;
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or
interest in it, will be benefitted, if at all, by the construction of the improvement proposed
by the plaintiff. If the benefit is equal to the damages assessed under Subsection (2), the
owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion
taken; but if the benefit is less than the damages assessed, the former shall be deducted
from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the
value of the portion taken;
(5) if the properly sought to be condemned consists of water rights or part of a water
delivery system or both, and the taking will cause present or future damage to or
impairment of the water delivery system not being taken, including impairment of the
system's carrying capacity, an amount to compensate for the damage or impairment;
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(6) if land on which crops are growing at the time of service of summons is sought to
be condemned, the value that those crops would have had after being harvested, taking
into account the expenses that would have been incurred cultivating and harvesting the
crops; and
(7) as far as practicable compensation shall be assessed for each source of damages
separately.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
UDOT brought condemnation proceedings against two adjacent pieces of property
in the summer of 1997. UDOT did not seek ownership of the entire parcels of land, but
only portions thereof.1 Admiral Beverage owned one of the properties and purchased the
other. R. 72-75 in Case No. 970905361. On July 14, 1999, the district court consolidated
these actions under Case No. 970905361. R. 98-99 in Case No. 970905361; R. 63-64 in
Case No. 970905368.2
In January 2005, UDOT filed a motion in limine, asking that the defendant be
precluded from presenting evidence at trial of severance damages caused by a loss of
visibility into the noncondemned portions of the property.3 R. 151-63. Admiral Beverage
filed a motion in limine asking the court to allow several types of severance damage
evidence, including that caused by loss of visibility and loss of view. R. 168-409. In its
Memorandum Decision and Order of October 31, 2005, the court granted UDOT's
1

UDOT v. Mark Inv. Corp.. Case No. 970905361 (R. 11-20) and UDOT v.
Admiral Beverage Corp., Case No. 970905368 (R. 1-10).
2

All farther references to the record are to Case No. 970905361.

3

The loss of visibility damages were allegedly caused by UDOT's construction
and modification of the freeway that restricted the remaining property's visibility to
travelers on 1-15. R. 152-53.
3

motion and denied Admiral Beverage's motion. R. 492-502, a copy is attached as
Addendum A. The court concluded that no claim for loss of visibility from a freeway
existed. R. 495-98.
In May 2006, the district court certified this order as being final pursuant to Utah
R. Civ. P. 54(b). R. 520-26. Admiral Beverage filed its appeal on May 8, 2006. R. 52744. On August 11, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed that appeal without
prejudice because the district court's order was not eligible for certification as final under
Rule 54(b). R. 556-59.
In August and October of 2007, UDOT filed further motions in limine. R. 656-64,
727-35.

These motions challenged Admiral Beverage's intent to use evidence of

damages related to its loss of visibility into its property from 1-15. The motions also
asked the district court to exclude any severance damages claimed to be caused by
changes to a road or freeway that did not abut the defendant's property. In opposing
these motions, defendant claimed that it should be permitted to present evidence of
damages arising from alleged loss of view out of the remaining property and for loss of
visibility of the remaining property from 1-15. R. 669-84, 757-75
In its minute entry of December 27, 2007, the district court granted UDOT's
motions. R. 862-67, a copy is attached as Addendum B. Defendant filed its petition for
an interlocutory appeal on January 16, 2008. R. 875. This action came within the
original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (West Supp.
2008). On January 17, 2008, this Court transferred this action to the Utah Court of
4

Appeals pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 877. On
January 30, 2008, that court granted the defendant's petition as to "[wjhether the trial
court erred in excluding evidence of severance damages based on loss of view from the
remaining property." R. 895.
On November 28, 2008, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's order.
Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.. 2008 UT App 426, 198 P.3d 1003. The
court held that the appurtenant easement of view only applied to a public road that
abutted the property in question. IcL at ^3. The court also rejected the defendant's claim
that it should be compensated for an alleged loss of visibility from 1-15. Id, at ^[5 n.2.
Defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court that was granted.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The facts concerning the location of Admiral Beverage's property and how it
relates to 1-15 are taken from Judge Roth's Memorandum Decision and Order of October
31, 2005. R. 492-502. The district court found that the facts were not "disputed in any
material way." R. 493. Defendant has never claimed that there was a material issue of
fact.
Admiral Beverage owns two adjacent lots that are west of 1-15 in Salt Lake
County. The property abuts the west side of 500 West, a surface street owned by Salt
Lake City, which acts as a frontage road in that area. 500 West runs between Admiral
Beverage's property and 1-15. R. 664 (map of Admiral Beverage's property showing its
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relationship with 1-15 and the portions to be condemned - a copy is attached as
Addendum C).
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the
freeway in that area was moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the
500 West frontage road also be moved further to the west and onto the east
side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are now
identified as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these
consolidated cases.
R. 493.
The parcels of land taken from Admiral Beverage for the project were used for the
reconstruction of 500 West, a street owned by Salt Lake City. As part of the
reconstruction, 500 West was moved farther west and partially onto Admiral Beverage's
property. The changes were made by UDOT. None of the defendant's property was used
for the remodeled 1-15. R. 494. While not mentioned by Judge Roth, it is undisputed that
both before and after the reconstruction of 1-15 access to Admiral Beverage's property
was gained by use of 500 West. R. 657.
Admiral Beverage's interlocutory appeal challenged the district court's orders
granting UDOT's three motions in limine. UDOT's first motion asked that the defendant
be precluded from presenting evidence at trial of severance damages caused by a loss of
visibility into the noncondemned portions of the property from 1-15. R. 151-63. UDOT's
second motion challenged the appraisal prepared by Jerry Webber because it included the
same loss-of-visibility damages excluded by the district court's prior order. R. 727-35.
Defendant acknowledges that Mr. Webber said he was unable to separate damages caused
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from loss of view (out) from damages caused by loss of visibility (in). R. 774; Brief of
Appellant at 15-16. UDOT's third motion asked that severance damages claimed to be
caused by changes to a road or freeway that did not abut the defendant's property be
excluded. R. 656-64.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Admiral Beverage sought to introduce evidence that the value of its property had
been diminished due to the loss of view and visibility caused by the reconstruction of I15. But defendant's property does not abut 1-15. The land is on the west side of 500
West, which it abuts, while 1-15 is to the east of 500 West. The appurtenant easement of
view (out) is a property right that attaches only to the abutting roadway (500 West), not to
other property or roadways.
This Court has expressly held that Utah does not recognize a damage claim based
on a property's loss of visibility (in) from a roadway. Utah law has repeatedly rejected
efforts to create a property right in the flow of traffic on the public roads past a certain
piece of land.
Defendant seeks to circumvent the prior rulings of this Court by claiming damages
for loss of visibility and view as part of a single sum for the market value of the property.
It does so without challenging the prior Utah judicial decisions that have refused to create
the property rights for which it seeks compensation. Defendant has not asked this Court
to overrule its prior decisions and has failed to meet its burden under the principle of stare
decisis.
7

ARGUMENT
Whether severance damages are sought under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution or Utah's statutes, the result is the same. This Court has used the same
definition for "damages" under the takings clause of the state constitution and the eminent
domain statutes. Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah 1990); Bd. of
Educ. v. Croft. 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1962). In relation to alleged damages suffered
by property that was not actually condemned, such damages are limited to those available
at common law or that involve some physical injury to the property.
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or industrial
improvement, though no part thereof is taken as provided for under 7834-10(3), . . . is limited to injuries that would be actionable at common law,
or where there has been some physical disturbance of a right, either public
or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with his property and
which gives it additional value, and which causes him to sustain a special
damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public
generally.
Croft, 373 P.2d at 699 (footnote omitted) (rejecting claim for damages to remaining
property allegedly caused by construction of school where the school was not built on that
portion of plaintiffs' land that was condemned). See also Coleman, 795 P.2d at 626-627;
Harold Selman. Inc. v. Box Elder County. 2009 UT App 99, ^[9, 208 P.3d 535 (the takings
provision of the Utah Constitution does not apply unless the claimant possesses a
protectable interest in the property). More recently this Court used common law
principles in interpreting the eminent domain statutes.
Our holding today also accords with the well-established common law
principle that severance damages "may be made for any diminution in the
8

value of [an owner's non-condemned land], as long as those damages were
directly caused by the taking itself and by the condemnor's use of the land
taken."
State v. Harvev Real Estate. 2002 UT 107, ^11, 57 P.3d 1088 (alteration and first
emphasis in original, second emphasis added).
The defendant had the duty to demonstrate that it owned the claimed protected
property interest and that the interest had been taken or damaged.
Under article I, section 22, the takings analysis has two principal steps.
First, the claimant must demonstrate "some protectible interest in property."
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990). If the
claimant possesses a protectible property interest, the claimant must then
show that the interest has been "taken or damaged" by government action.
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City. 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996).
I. THE DEFENDANT'S APPURTENANT EASEMENT OF VIEW
ONLY APPLIES TO THE ABUTTING PUBLIC ROAD - 500 WEST
Admiral Beverage's claims for severance damages for loss of view and visibility
related to the reconstruction of 1-15. Loss of view damages are caused by obstructions
that block the view out from that portion of the property that was not condemned. Loss of
visibility damages are caused by obstructions that block the view into the noncondemned
portion of the property from a roadway or highway.
It is undisputed that the defendant's property does not abut 1-15. Defendant's
property is divided and separated from 1-15 by 500 West, a street owned by Salt Lake
City. This physical condition existed both before and after the 1-15 reconstruction. As
part of the 1-15 reconstruction project, Salt Lake City's 500 West was moved by UDOT
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further to the west, partially on land taken from the defendant due to the expansion of the
freeway onto part of Salt Lake City's land. The defendant can nol claim damages for loss
of view caused by changes made to a public road that his property did not abut.
Utah has long recognized that an owner of land that abuts a public road enjoys
rights of easement of access, air, light, and view to the public road. In Dooly Block v.
Salt Lake Rapid Transit. 33 P. 229, 231 (Utah 1893), this Court explained that abutting
property owners had the right of access to the street "subject only to the ordinary use of
the same for the purposes of public travel, and that they are entitled to the use of said
street, free from unreasonable obstructions, as a means of access, light, and air to their
premises."
The appurtenant rights of air, light, and view discussed in Dooly Block and Utah
State Road Commission v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974) are companion to, and
derivative of, the easement for physical access. "The rights of access, light, and air are
easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute
property rights forming part of the owner's estate." Miya. 526 P.2d at 928.4 As such,
they create no right greater than the right to physical access. They consist of the right to
use the public street for access, light, air, and view. They impose no greater burden on
the public right of way than the servitude necessary to provide the right of access.
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"An owner of land abutting on a street is also in possession of an easement of
view, which constitutes a property right which may not be taken without just
compensation." Id at 929.
10

These rights are properly described as rights, or easements, appurtenant to property
that abuts a public street. Abut is defined as "[t]o reach; to touch. . . . No intervening
land." Black's Law Dictionary 11 (5th ed. 1979). To claim an appurtenant easement, a
landowner must meet two requirements. First, the land in question must abut the roadway
in question. Second, the roadway must be a public road. Okemo Mountain, Inc. v.
Ludlow. 762 A.2d 1219, 1225 (Vt. 2000).
Abutting owners have certain private rights which are not common
to the public generally, such as the rights of view, of light and air, and of
lateral support, but these rights are subordinate to the right of passage of
the public, and are subject to reasonable regulation and restriction.
An abutting owner has two distinct kinds of rights in a highway: a
public right which he or she enjoys in common with all other citizens, and
certain private rights which arise from his or her ownership of property
contiguous to the highway, and which are not common to the public
generally, and this is the case regardless of whether or not the fee of the
highway is in him or her. These rights are property of which he or she may
not be deprived without his or her consent, except on full compensation and
by due process of law.
39A C.J.S. Highways § 140 (Westlaw through June 2009) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
These appurtenant easements apply only to the abutting roadway and not to any
other road or property. "This state has long recognized that a landowner owning property
abutting a public street possesses as appurtenant to his lot implied easements for light, air
and view over the public street. These easements extend to the full width of the street and
are independent of any fee interest in the street held by the landowner." Haeussler v.
Braun, 314 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1981). The right of view does not pass beyond the public
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roadway and cross out the other side. Neither does it travel laterally up and down the
highway. The right does not extend across the abutting roadway to burden private and
public property on the other side of the public street to guarantee a view over such
property. Utah's courts have regularly described the right as one of reasonable access to
and from the property to use the public road.
The interest protected simply entails the "right of ingress and egress to and
from . . . property and the abutting public highway." Harvey's property may
be accessed through both the new frontage road and Old Mountain Road;
consequently, its right of access has not been denied. The right does not
extend so far as to guarantee a property owner that his property will be
accessed through specific intersections or that the roads accessing his
property will be easily accessed from other thoroughfares.
State v. Harvev Real Estate. 2002 UT 107, f 14, 57 P.3d 1088 (citation omitted).
This approach to the rights appurtenant is also incorporated into Utah Code Ann.
§ 72-1-102(11) (West 2004), which defines a limited-access facility as
a highway especially designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to
which neither owners nor occupants of abutting lands nor other persons
have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of
access, light, air, or view.
The courts of other states have also followed the general rule that a landowner
does not have appurtenant easements over the property of their neighbors. These
easements only apply to the public road that abuts their property.
As a general matter, a landowner cannot recover from a neighboring
landowner simply because he dislikes the use to which the second
landowner put his property. Thus, a landowner could not recover from his
neighbor just because the other had erected a building on his own property
which blocked the view from the first owner's land, or the visibility of the
first owner's land. The only way to prevent a neighbor from constructing a
12

building which would block one's view is to buy an easement of view. The
logical implication of this position is that a property owner has no right to
an unobstructed line of vision to his property from anywhere off of his
property, absent an easement of some sort.
8.960 Square Feet v. State, 806 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Alaska 1991) (citation and footnotes
omitted). Seeal_so Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 778 P.2d 534, 537 (Wash. App. 1989)
("The general rule appears to be that a building or structure cannot be complained of as a
nuisance merely because it obstructs the view of neighboring property.").
It is undisputed that Admiral Beverage's property does not abut 1-15. It has at all
times abutted 500 West, not the freeway. The freeway was built, and remains today, on
property found on the far side of 500 West from the defendant's land. Defendant's
appurtenant easements pertain to 500 West and not to 1-15. Judge Faust's decision
correctly took this fact into consideration. "Defendant is able to assert claims for any
severance damages relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner
to 500 West." R. 863. The district court correctly applied Utah law and was properly
affirmed by the court of appeals.
The defendant does not directly address this issue in its brief. Instead, Admiral
Beverage relies solely on Ivers v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802.
Defendant correctly notes that this Court held that damages caused by a loss of the
appurtenant easement of view can be claimed, in appropriate circumstances, whether or
not the obstruction was actually built on the condemned portion of the property. Ivers,
2007 UT 19 at f26. But defendant fails to acknowledge that the easement for view in
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Ivers clearly pertained to the state road whose reconstruction was alleged to have caused
the loss of view. The land in Ivers abutted the road in question, h i at 1fl[3-4 (property
that abutted Highway 89 was condemned to build a new frontage road while the right of
view was allegedly damaged by elevation of Highway 89). Further, in Ivers the court
followed Miya in describing the rights in question as being "easements appurtenant to the
land of an abutting owner on a street." Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at ^|13.
Defendant errs in reading Ivers too broadly. This Court did not separate the
appurtenant easement of view, a property right, from the property it is appurtenant to.
The easement of view applies only to public roads that abut the land in question. It does
not attach to other roads that may be close by. It did not attach to 1-15 but only to 500
West, the street abutting Admiral Beverage's property.
II. UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE DAMAGE CLAIMS FOR LOSS
OF VISIBILITY
Even if Admiral Beverage were permitted to claim loss of view damages related to
a roadway that did not abut its property (1-15), the district court's granting of UDOT's
motions in limine was still correct. All of the excluded evidence included claims for
damages based on a loss of visibility. R. 151-63, 495-98, 656-64, 727-35, 773.
Defendant not only acknowledges this, but argues in its brief that it is impossible to
segregate damages caused by a loss of view from those allegedly caused by a loss of
visibility. Brief of Appellant at 15-16.
But Utah does not recognize a claim for loss of visibility.
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Neither the legislature nor this court has recognized a protected
property right in visibility of one's property from the roadway. As a result,
the court of appeals concluded that Arby's was not entitled to present
evidence of claimed damage to their property caused by a loss of visibility
of the property. We agree. In Utah, landowners do not have a protected
interest in the visibility of their property from an abutting road, even if part
of their land has been taken in the process.
In Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, we concluded that the
"rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an
abutting owner on a street. We also concluded in Miya that "[a] property
owner has no property right to a free and unrestricted flow of traffic past his
premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle
the owner to compensation." Similarly, a property owner has no
recognized property right to free and unrestricted visibility of his property
by passing traffic, and an impairment of that visibility does not mandate
compensation.
The speculative nature of the damages sought in a claim for loss of
visibility further supports this conclusion. As the court of appeals correctly
noted, a claim for loss of visibility is essentially a claim for compensation
for lost business profits. Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution
simply does not create a protectable property interest in the mere hope of
future sales from passing traffic.
Because property owners have no protectable property interest in
visibility, the trial court was correct in granting the motion in limine on this
issue, and the court of appeals was correct in affirming.
Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at ffl[12-15 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Admiral Beverage fails to cite any precedent that would have permitted the lower
courts to allow defendant to seek damages for a claim that is not recognized by Utah law.
The court of appeals would have erred if it permitted evidence of alleged impairment of
visibility to be submitted contrary to this Court's decision in Ivers. Far from
distinguishing between what damage was attributable to loss of view as opposed to loss of
visibility, the excluded evidence expressly conflated the two. Brief of Appellant at 15-16.
In an effort to circumvent Ivers, Admiral Beverage relies on State Road Comm'n
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v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971) for the proposition that damages attributed to the
purported loss of visibility can be awarded, as long as they are mixed with other alleged
damages and not stated as a separate amount. This is a mischaracterization of Rohan.
Rohan involved a claim for severance damages to the remaining property after one-fifth
of the land had been condemned for the construction of a freeway. The court upheld a
general award of damages based on an appraisal that included consideration of a
reduction in the property's value due to the increase in noise that would be caused by the
adjacent freeway being built. The plurality opinion in Rohan permitted the consideration
of noise damage even though it could not be raised as a separate claim of damage. Id. at
859.
Defendant claims that, like the noise addressed in Rohan, alleged damages for loss
of visibility can be presented as long as they are mixed with other damage claims and not
separately presented. But the two are not similar. Rohan cited to the prior law of Utah as
to when an increase of noise can be considered a compensable damage claim. Id. at 858
n.4. One of the cases cited in this footnote is Twenty-Second Corp. of Church of Jesus
Christ of Tatter-Dav Saints v. Oregon Shortline. 36 Utah 238, 103 P. 243 (1909). Oregon
Shortline made it clear that increased amounts of noise suffered by a landowner could, in
certain circumstances, state a damage claim.
It is true that, in addition to the foregoing cases, there are some in
which the courts have held that noises and other interferences arising from
the operation of railroad trains are proper elements of damage when they
affect the use and enjoyment of property. Among this class of cases are
those which relate to the condemnation of property for public purposes,
16

including railroads, where all the property is not taken, but the property not
taken is, nevertheless, affected, or where some easement appurtenant to the
property not taken is interfered with so as to affect the salable or usable
value thereof. In that class of cases noises and similar interferences which
may affect the market value of the property not taken are ordinarily
permitted to be shown, not as independent elements of damage, but as
elements to be considered in connection with all other things which may
depreciate the market value of the property interfered with but not taken.
103 P. at 249.
Utah law recognized noise as a damage to property, but limited recovery for it due
to valid public policy considerations.
If mere annoyances from noises give a right of action for damages, then
every one who is annoyed must be permitted to sue for and recover
damages to the extent to which he is affected. The question therefore, in
each case, would depend upon the intensity of the noises and the extent of
the annoyance.

14
Loss of visibility is not similar to a claim that a landowner's enjoyment of his
property has been damaged by noise. While Utah law has recognized a limited right to
recover for damage due to noise, it has never recognized an appurtenant easement of
visibility. In Ivers the court held that "a property owner has no recognized property right
to free and unrestricted visibility of his property by passing traffic." Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at
1J13. Defendant sought recovery for a diminution of the visibility of its property by the
traveling public, even though this Court has expressly held that no such right existed.
This is contrary to the decision of this Court in one of the cases cited by the defendant.
"To recover under article I, section 22, a claimant must possess a protectable interest in
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property that is taken or damaged for a public use." Bagford v. Ephraim City. 904 P.2d
1094, 1097 (Utah 1995). This has long been the law of Utah. "The Constitution clearly
does not require compensation for damages not recognized as actionable at common law."
State v. Dist. Ct.. 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, 510 (1937).
Defendant argues that it can seek compensation for its loss of visibility, even
though no such property right exists, by combining this item of damages as part of the fair
market value. But Utah law requires that "as far as practicable compensation shall be
assessed for each source of damage separately." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(7) (West
Supp. 2008).
Loss of visibility is not similar to a claim that a landowner's enjoyment of his
property has been damaged by a loss of a scenic view. In effect, the defendant landowner
claims a vested right to view and be viewed by passing traffic. Whether it is couched in
terms of a right to view or a right of visibility, a landowner cannot claim a vested right in
passing traffic. Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at 1fl[13-15. Establishment and regulation of traffic
movement is a function of state police powers, and the fact that 1-15 may bring traffic
near the property does not create a vested right. The government may direct the traffic
elsewhere without a claim for loss of property rights. "[W]hat the police power may give
an abutting property in the way of traffic on the highway it may take away .. . ."
Hampton v. Rd. Comm'n. 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708, 711 (1968).
In affirming the exclusion of evidence of damages caused by an alleged loss of
visibility, the court of appeals was following this Court's prior decisions.
18

Insofar as Admiral still seeks to admit evidence addressing the
reduced visibility of its property to motorists traveling the nearby highways,
its argument is definitively foreclosed by I vers. See 2007 UT 19, ^12-15,
154P.3d802.
Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2008 UT App 426, ^5 n.2, 198 P.3d 1003.
The court of appeals correctly affirmed the exclusion of such evidence as being
impermissible and that decision should be affirmed.
III. DEFENDANT'S MARKET VALUE ARGUMENT IGNORES
UTAH PRECEDENT THAT REJECTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE
PROPERTY RIGHTS DEFENDANT CLAIMS
In its brief, Admiral Beverage has not directly challenged the court of appeals'
decision. It has not argued that its property abuts or is contiguous to 1-15. It has not
disputed that this Court has held that Utah law does not recognize a right of visibility
from a roadway. Instead the defendant argues that to deny it severance damages based on
view and visibility would prevent it from obtaining the fair market value of its damages.
Brief of Appellant at 8-9, 15-18. Indeed, the defendant acknowledges that what it seeks is
contrary to current Utah law.
Utah cases which have permitted the taking of privately held rights
without payment of compensation make no effort to reconcile the
undeniable inconsistency and conflict of such takings with the above quoted
constitutional, statutory or case law. No justification is given for the unfair
and forced transfer to UDOT of substantial property rights without payment
of any compensation, let alone just compensation.
Brief of Appellant at 9.
But the defendant has not sought to shoulder its burden when it asks this Court to
overturn its prior decisions. It has not fully acknowledged that the reason for prior Utah
19

cases that have held contrary to Admiral Beverage's desires is because Utah has not
recognized the particular private property rights that it claims. The defendant had the
burden to convince this Court to overrule these prior decisions. It has failed to fulfill that
duty.
Those asking us to overturn prior precedent have a substanlial burden of
persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis. . . .
The general American doctrine as applied to courts of last resort is that a
court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but will follow the rule
of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced
that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing
from precedent.
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994); Hover v. State. 2009 UT 38, %L6
("For us to abandon the Taylor standard, the Hoyers have to meet the 'substantial burden
of persuasion' required for us to overturn our prior precedent and disregard 'the doctrine
of stare decisis.5"); State v. Bennett. 2000 UT 34 f 8, 999 P.2d 1 ("But both ignore the
fact that we do not lightly overrule our prior opinions.").
Indeed, this Court rejected the market value argument made by Admiral Beverage
in Ivers. Defendant quotes a partial sentence from Ivers in its brief. "[T]he pursuant loss
of view and visibility, diminished the market value of the remaining land." Brief of
Appellant at 11 (arguing that the facts of this case are the same as those found in Ivers).
Reading the entirety of the sentence emphasizes that the defendants in Ivers did raise the
same market value claim as does Admiral Beverage. "Arby's sought severance damages,
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claiming that the condemnation, and the pursuant loss of view and visibility, diminished
the market value of their remaining land." Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at §5.
This Court has repeatedly rejected the existence of a right of visibility by the
traveling public. In Ivers, this Court cited to its prior decision in Miya that rejected such
a right. Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at Tj 13. Besides Hampton, cited above in Point II, Justice
Wolfe of this Court reached the same conclusion in State v. Rozelle, 101 Utah 464, 120
P.2d 276, 278 (1941) (Wolfe concurring).
Any losses resulting from unreasonably cutting off their own access to their
property or unreasonably interfering with their light and air given by reason
of their abutting on a public highway are compensable. But not the loss of
flow of traffic from the street into their place of business. The law does not
give them a vested right in the business which travel along a public
highway may have afforded them.
This Court also followed Miya and Hampton in State v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002
UT 107,1J14, 57 P.3d 1088 (finding that there was no right to a particular flow of traffic).
Utah law has long held that the right of view is an appurtenant easement possessed
by land that abuts a public roadway. As cited above, the right to view was held by this
Court to apply to property abutting the public road in question in Ivers, Miya, Harvey,
and Dooly Block. See Point I, above. The same result was reached in Bailey Serv. &
Supply Corp. v. State, 533 P.2d 882, 883 (Utah 1975) ("It is generally held that an
abutting property owner has an easement of access, light and air."). "We have held that
an abutting property owner may recover for losses sustained such as result from the
shutting off or interfering with his access, light, or air." Rozelle, 120 P.2d at 278.
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The challenged court of appeals' decision simply followed the prior decisions of
this Court. The defendant has failed to explain why this Court's prior decisions were
originally erroneous or are no longer sound. The defendant having failed to shoulder its
"substantial burden," the court of appeals should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, the respondent urges this Court to affirm the
decision of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of June, 2009.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Respondent
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ADDENDUM "A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH
DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION,

OF

Plaintiff,
vs.
ADMIRAL
BEVERAGE
CORPORATION (Assignee of Mark
Investment Trust); PARK CITY WEST
& ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK &
TRUST COMPANY nka BANK ONE,
UTAH; and VALLEY MORTGAGE
COMPANY nka UTAH INVESTMENT
COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION and
ORDER (Cross-Motions in Limine)

CONSOLIDATED:
Case No. 970905361 CD
Case No. 970905368CD

Defendants.
Judge Stephen L. Roth
UTAH
DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION,

OF

Plaintiff,
vs.

ADMIRAL
CORPORATION,

BEVERAGE

Defendant.

Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion in Limine to which
efendant Admiral Beverage Coiporation ("Admiral") responded with a cross-motion, Motion in
imine of Defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect
air Market Value ("Admiral's Motion in Limine"). While both motions are nominally focused on

the parties" competing views of the admissibility of basically the same evidence, they recognize that
the real issue is the scope of severance damages that may be awarded to defendants under Utah
condemnation law. The parties submitted memoranda supporting their own motions and opposing
their opponents, as well as reply memoranda. The court heard argument on the motions on June 28,
2005, where UDOT was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, and Admiral
was represented by Rex E. Madsen (who argued) and Reed L. Martineau, Snow Christensen &
Martineau. The court gave leave to Admiral to submit a new survey in response to one submitted
by UDOT just before the hearing. That survey was provided to the court on August 31, 2005, and
the matter was submitted for decision. Having considered the memoranda, affidavits and other
evidence submitted, along with the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS UDOT's Motion in
Limine and DENIES Admiral's Motion in Limine, for the reasons set forth below.
DECISION
A.

Factual Background.
The relevant facts do not appear to be disputed in any material way. Admiral owns two

adjacent lots directly to the west of the 1-15 freeway, bordering 500 West, which serves as a frontage
road in that area, running north and south between the Admiral lots and the west side of the freeway.
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the freeway in that area was
moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 500 West frontage road also be moved further
to the west and onto the east side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are
now identified by UDOT as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these consolidated cases.

-?.

Before reconstruction, the existing freeway lanes had an elevation about two feet higher than
the surface of Admiral's property. The reconstructed freeway is elevated considerably higher, with
a portion of the freeway wall reaching a height of about 28 feet at a point about six inches outside
and to the west of the southeast corner of parcel 109, the former southeast corner of the Admiral
property, and about 62 feet from the nearest point of Admiral's property remaining after the
condemnation.1 While 500 West was reconstructed on the taken parcels, no part of the rebuilt
freeway itself is located on that property.
Based on an appraisal, UDOT deposited into court a total of $163,100 as payment of just
condemnation for the taking of parcels 109 and 110. Admiral appears to have only minimal
disagreement that the deposited amount is a fair value for the property taken, as valued on a squarefootage basis. The central issue is whether there are additional compensable severance damages to
the remainder of Admiral's property. Based on the reports of its own expert appraisal witnesses,
Admiral claims that the market value of the remaining property has been reduced by "( a ) loss of air,
light, view? visibility and aesthetics, and (b) increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the
reconstructed 1-15 freeway . . .." Admiral's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine to
Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value and in Opposition to Plaintiffs

1

Admiral originally argued that a portion of the freeway wall at issue was actually built
within the southeast corner of parcel 109, based on UDOT engineering drawings that appeared to
support such a conclusion. About two weeks before the hearing, however, UDOT submitted,
through the Affidavit of Keith Hafen, a more detailed survey that showed the wall, at its nearest
point, to be six inches outside of the condemned parcel 109. Subsequent to the hearing, Admiral had
its own survey done, which confirmed that the wall was outside of parcel 109, although four to five
inches at its closest point rather than six, a difference that is not material to the issues before the
court.

Motion in Limine ("Admiral's Memorandum in Support") at 2. UDOT contends that these rights
are not compensable as severance damages under applicable law.
B.

Analysis.
The factors identified by Admiral's appraisers as damaging the remaining property seem to

fall into three categories: the loss of visibility and prominence of the remainder due to the size and
location of the new freeway structures; loss of air and light to, and view from, the remaining
property; and the increase in noise, dust, fumes and so on from increased traffic flow nearer to the
remainder than the prior freeway. The claim for loss of visibility is the only subject addressed in
UDOT's Motion in Limine, but all of these factors are addressed in Admiral's Motion in Limine,
which is imposed in toto by UDOT. The loss of visibility issue is addressed separately as a matter
of first impression in Utah.
1.

Loss of Visibility.

There seems to be no dispute that reconstruction of the portion of I-15 passing by the Admiral
property, which moved the freeway closer and significantly raised its grade, restricts the visibility
of the remainder parcels from passing vehicles in comparison with the prior freeway configuration.
The issue of whether reduced visibility is a compensable severance damage has not been directly
addressed by Utah appellate courts. Nevertheless, the court believes that analogous Utah case law
provides guidance in this area.
A long line of Utah cases has established the principle that the appurtenant rights of an owner
of abutting property do not include an interest in the traffic flow from a public road or highway
passing by his property that justifies severance damages if reduced or taken away. In Hampton v.
State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), the court noted that fctthe right of ingress or
-4-

egress to or from one's property [does not] include any right in and to existing public traffic on the
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property." Id. at 711. The court
explained:
The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of
the State, and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the way
of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the
State and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by
reason of such diversion of traffic, because such damages are "damnum absque
injuria'' or damage without legal injury.
Id. at 347. See also, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop, 362 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah
1961) ('The owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other vested right in
the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not entitled to compensation when that flow of
traffic is diminished as a result of eminent domain proceedings"); Utah State Road Commission v.
Miya, 526 P.2d 926,928 (Utah 1974) ("A property owner has no right to a free and unrestricted flow
of traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle the
owner to compensation."); Utah Department ofTransportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107,
^|14 (citing Miya and quoting Hampton for the principle stated above).
Here, a significant portion of Admiral's claimed severance is based on the reduction in
visibility from the reconstructed freeway when compared to its original configuration. The visibility
that was lost, under these circumstances, was necessarily a function of the passage of traffic. In other
words, the original visibility of the site resulted from the construction of the freeway by the State,
which exposed the Admiral property to the view of passing motorists who used the freeway as a
route of travel. Under existing law, if the State had moved the freeway route horizontally, to a
different location far enough from the Admiral property that it traffic no longer passed by it, the
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deprivation of the passing traffic itself would not be a compensable injur/. It is difficult to see how
moving the freeway vertically, so that traffic continues to pass by the property but without being able
to see it, results in an injury that is any different as a practical matter or that is legally distinctive in
any meaningful way. The court therefore does not believe that diminishment of visibility from a
road or highway is any more compensable as severance damages than a more general diversion oi
traffic flow would be.
Moreover, even if a right to visibility were found to be appurtenant to landowners abutting
a highway or road, the rights of abutting owners with respect to a freeway are significantly more
limited. 1-15 is a tc[l]imited-access facility," which is defined by statute as "a highway especially
designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants of abutting
lands nor any other persons have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of
access, light, air, or view." U.C.A. § 72-1-102 (11). This definition suggests, among other things,
an intent to restrict the appurtenant rights of lands abutting freeways so as to limit the scope of
severance damages attributable to such rights.
Admiral relies in part on People v. Ricardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944), and subsequent
decisions following it, for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to severance damages for the
loss of the view of his property from a highway. The California Court of Appeals, however,
subsequently held that Ricardi's "right to a view" does not apply to freeways. The court upheld the
lower court's conclusion that an owner uhas no legal right to a view of his property from the
freeway:'
A freeway is unlike a highway. An abutter/landowner has a right to a view from a
public road or highway. However, while the purpose of a highway is to provide
landowners with abutter's rights, the purpose of a freeway is to eliminate those rights.
-6-

People ex rel Department of Transportation v. Wilson, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 55 (Cal.App. 1994)
(citation to Ricardi omitted). The court noted that the purpose of roads or highways is to allow
access from abutting private property and to allow travelers along the road or highway "to view a
business, drive into it, patronize it, and reenter the highway" but that "[s]uch purposes are
antagonistic to the purpose of a freeway," which is designed to "'prevent just that sort of thing.*'*
Id. (citations omitted). The court went on to discuss a California statute similar in import to Utah's:
For that reason, Streets and Highway Code section 23.5 provides that owners of
abutting lands to a freeway have limited or no right of access to or from their abutting
lands. Obviously a freeway restricts rights of access and related rights such as the
right to a view.
Id
Therefore, even if the court were inclined to find a right to a view of one's abutting property
from a road or highway under Utah law, the court concludes that a landowner "has no legal right to
a view of his property from the freeway."
2.

Other Damages.

Admiral also claims it is entitled to severance damages for "loss of air, light, view, visibility
and aesthetics," a bundle of rights that may include, but goes beyond, the right to a view from the
freeway, as well as for "increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the reconstructed 1-15
freeway." The court concludes that Utah law does not allow recovery for such damages under the
circumstances of these consolidated cases.
The claimed damages appear to arise either from the elevation of the grade of the freeway
or from increased traffic due to the freeway improvements. Neither the construction of the elevated
ramp or the reconstruction of the freeway itself, however, occurred on Admiral's property; the only
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improvement constructed on Admiral's property was the relocation of the 500 West frontage road.
Utah cases have been consistent in holding that severance damages are limited to those caused by
the taking itself or attributable to improvements constructed on the taken property. The court in
Miya. in finding compensable the loss of view from a remainder property caused by construction of
a highway highway structure, noted that "the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure
to be erected, in pari at least, upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit" was a
factor to be taken into account in determining severance damages. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929 (emphasis
added).
This precept was emphasized in Utah Dep 7 of Transportation v. D Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220
(Utah 1987), where the state took a private road to two residences, which it paved and made public
in connection with a highway extension. The Court rejected the landowners' claim that they were
entitled to severance damages from construction of the highway:
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable. Such damages suffered
generally by all the property owners in the area are deemed consequential.
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of
property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes
injury to that portion of the parcel not taken.
Id at 1221-22 (emphasis in the original).
The court reemphasized its D 'Ambrosio holding in Harvey Real Estate, supra, an appeal of
a trial court's grant of the state's motion in limine excluding certain severance damage evidence.
In Harvey, the landowner sought severance damages for the diminution in value of its remainder
property resulting from the closure of an intersection as part of a road project for which a portion of
its land was taken. Similar to an argument Admiral makes here, the OAvner contended that the
-8-

int ersec,ionclosure"was m adepossibleo„lyby.he,aki„gofHarveysprope rt y...»Ha^,2002

UT 107, 112. Harvey asserted that limiting severance damages to only those resulting from
improvements constructed a, leas, in par, on the porta of the property taken conflict* with the
broad language of U.C.A. § 78-34-10(2), which provides for assessment of damages ,o a remainder
from the taking of a portion of the property and from "the construction of the improvement in the
proposed by the plaintiff [condemning authority]." Tire court disagreed:
Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused
bv,he construction of the improvement made on the severed property, t does not
given the landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets
of the construction project.
*

*

*

We held essentially the same in Utah Department of Transportation v. DAmbr<mo
741P 2d 1220,1222 (Utah 1987), although we did not reference section 78o4-l 0(2).
There we stated that "severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion
If the parcel of property where the taking or the construction of Improvement on
tat pat causes injury to that portion of the property not taken." (Emphasis added.
Ou ho Ming today also accords with the well-established common law principle that
feveranc damages "may be made for any diminution in the value of [an owner s
Ton condemned land], as long as those damages were directly caused by the taking
LVand^thecondemnor'suseofthela
§ 368 (1996) (emphasis added)
Id a, 1110-11 (interpolations and emphasis in the original, some citations omitted).
The court therefore concludes that damages resulting from construction of the elevated ramp
j * outside the taken parcels, as well as damages from the reconfiguration of the freeway as par, of
lhe

reconstruction project are no, compensable as severance damages under U,ah law. This appears

,„ include evidence related ,o all of t h e components of severance damages" that were taken in.o
accoun," by Admiral's expert appraisers and enumera.ed a, paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Robert
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A. Steele and paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of John C. Brown (Exhibits A and B, respectively, to
Admiral's Memorandum in Support), except for "loss of parking."2
ORDER
It is therefore ORDERED that UDOT's Motion in Limine is GRANTED, and Admiral's
Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value is DENIED.
DATED this _5[_ day of October, 2005.

Stephen L. Roth
'-j v
DISTRICT JUDGE U

2

The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule that the court has
relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, it is certainly possible that the court's
decision would have been significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been
built six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. In this regard
Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal given the harsh result the difference of
a matter of inches may produce. That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated
project (which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled to compensation
for damages resulting from specific improvements related to the purpose of the taking and causing
specific injury to the remainder, even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries
of the take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion in
Limine . ... at 6-10. This approach recognizes that the actual reduction in value of the remainder
from the improvement, as a practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just
outside of the taken parcel.
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) holdings of the
Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from seriously considering such an approach
at this level, because it would involve a departure from current law. In this regard, the appellate
courts are better equipped to identify, analyze and resolve the competing public and private interests.
as well as the legal complications, that would be implicated in such a change in approach to
severance damages. The resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal.
-10-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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Defendants.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,
vs .
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

UDOT's Motions

in L i m i n e

on the i s s u e of v i e w a n d v i s i b i l i t y and

c o n c e r n i n g Jerry R. W e b e r ' s t e s t i m o n y on t h e s u b j e c t o f s e v e r a n c e

damages

caused by loss of v i e w and v i s i b i l i t y w a s h e a r d b y t h e C o u r t o n D e c e m b e r
18, 2 0 0 7 , at 10:00 a.m.

A f t e r h e a r i n g a r g u m e n t s t h e r e o n , r e v i e w o f the

p l e a d i n g s and a s p e c i f i c r e v i e w o f the D e c i s i o n d a t e d O c t o b e r

issued by Judge Roth in this casef
Limine.

3 1 s t , 2005

che Court grants UDOT's Motions in

The Court also refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and

adopts the same
Defendant

here.
is

able

to

assert

claims

for any

severance

damages

relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner
to 500 West.
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court.
Dated this 24th

day of December, 2007.

ROBERT P. FAUST
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby

certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this 9 ^

dav of December,

2007:

Randy S. Hunter
Barbara Ishimatsu
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Reed L. Martineau
Korey D. Rasmussen
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

irQiZfoeM^

Set ^

J>LA

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

CASE N O ( L 9 7 0 9 0 55361)
36l"
r3T8
9Tff9TJ5:
(Consolidated)

Plaintiff/
vs.
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION
(ASSIGNEE OF MARK INVESTMENT
COMPANY) ; PARK CITY WEST &
ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, nka BANK ONE, UTAH;
VALLEY MORTGAGE COMPANY, nka
UTAH INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendants.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/
vs.
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant.

UDOT's
(concerning

Motion

in

Jerry R.

Limine

Weber's

on

the

testimony

issue
on

of
the

view

and

subject

of

visibility
severance

damages cause d by loss of view and visibility) was heard by the Court on
December 18, 2007, at 10:00 a.m.

After hearing arguments thereon, revie w

of the pleadings and a specific review of the Decision dated October 31,

UDOT V. ADMIRAL
BEVERAGE CORP.

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

2005 issued by Judge Roth in this case, the Court grants UDOT's Motion
in Limine.

The Court refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and

adopts the same here.
Defendant

is able to assert claims for any severance damages

relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner
to 500 West.
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court.
Dated this 24th day of December, 2007.

ROBERT P. FAUST
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

^^

UDOT V. ADMIRAL
BEVERAGE CORP.

PAGE 3

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this

u

. \ UJ, day of -norrmhu^r,

200$:

Randy S. Hunter
Barbara Ishimatsu
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Reed L. Martineau
Korey D. Rasmussen
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
\
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NONE
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R1CM1

C o n c r e t e B l o c k Bu i d r a
M<SM 0 M r b u t o n

DRAW

N BY

LOCATION
REVISED

PARCELS

QKH

CHECKED BY

KRH

19QQ SOUTH 500 WEST

109

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

ESI E N G I N E E R I N G
3500 SOUTH MAIN
SUIIC 206
S»L1 LA*£ C I 1 1
Ul 84115
( 8 0 1 >263 ITS?
<801 1263 1780 fA

SCALE IN METERS
1 rOOT = 3048 METER
I 15 TAKINGS
DATE
29 MAY 1996
10b00 SOUTH TO 5 0 0 NORTH
COUNTY
SALT LAKE
RIGHT OF WAY PLAN SHEET
PROJECT N O

. SP 15 7(116)304

TEMP

SHEET

n

